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Summary 
As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), P.L. 111-148, as amended, 
Congress enacted a “minimum coverage provision,” which compels certain individuals to have a 
minimum level of health insurance (i.e., an “individual mandate”). Individuals who fail to do so 
may be subject to a monetary penalty, administered through the tax code. Congress has never 
compelled individuals to buy health insurance, and there has been significant controversy and 
debate over whether the requirement is within the scope of Congress’s legislative powers. 
Shortly after ACA was enacted, several lawsuits were filed that challenge the individual mandate 
on constitutional grounds. While some of these cases have been dismissed for procedural reasons, 
others have moved forward. These challenges have now reached the Supreme Court. During the 
last week of March, the Court heard arguments in HHS v. Florida, a case in which attorneys 
general and governors in 26 states as well as others brought an action against the Administration, 
seeking to invalidate the individual mandate and other provisions of ACA. Besides evaluating the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate, the Court is examining the question of whether the 
Anti-Injunction Act currently prevents the Court from ruling on the merits of the case. It also is 
considering the extent to which the minimum coverage provision can be severed from the 
remainder of ACA, if it is found to be unconstitutional. Finally, the Court is analyzing ACA’s 
expansion of the Medicaid program and whether it unconstitutionally “coerces” states into 
compliance with federal requirements. This last issue will be addressed in CRS Report R42367, 
Federalism Challenge to Medicaid Expansion Under the Affordable Care Act: Florida v. 
Department of Health and Human Services, by Kenneth R. Thomas. 
While there is no specific enumerated constitutional power to regulate health care or establish a 
minimum coverage provision, Congress’s taxing power or its power to regulate interstate 
commerce may be pertinent. With regard to the taxing power, the requirement to purchase health 
insurance might be construed as a tax and upheld so long as it was found to comply with the 
constitutional restrictions imposed on direct and indirect taxes. On the other hand, opponents of 
the minimum coverage provision may argue that since it is imposed conditionally and may be 
avoided by compliance with regulations set out in the statute, that the requirement may be more 
accurately described as a penalty. If so, the taxing power alone might not provide Congress the 
constitutional authority to support this provision.  
In evaluating the minimum coverage provision under the Commerce Clause, one of several issues 
that may be examined is whether the individual mandate is a regulation of economic activity. 
Some argue that the requirement to purchase health insurance is economic in nature because it 
regulates how an individual participates in the health care market, through insurance or otherwise. 
Conversely, others argue that forcing individuals to participate in commerce in order to regulate 
them goes beyond the bounds of the clause.  
This report analyzes certain constitutional issues raised by requiring individuals to purchase 
health insurance under Congress’s authority under its taxing power or its power to regulate 
interstate commerce. It also addresses whether the exceptions to the minimum coverage provision 
to purchase health insurance satisfy First Amendment freedom of religion protections. Finally, 
this report discusses some of the more publicized legal challenges to ACA, as well additional 
issues that are currently before the Court. 
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lthough the federal government provides health coverage for many individuals through 
federal programs such as Medicare, it has never required individuals to purchase health 
insurance until the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 (ACA) 
in March of 2010.2 While a requirement to transfer money to a private party may arise in other 
contexts (e.g., automobile insurance), it has been noted that these provisions are based on 
exercising a privilege, like driving a car.3 Thus, due at least in part to the novelty of this 
requirement, there have been questions debated over its constitutionality, and several lawsuits 
have challenged the minimum coverage provision on constitutional grounds. These challenges 
have reached the Supreme Court, where oral arguments in the cases took place during the last 
week of March, 2012. 
This report first analyzes the authority of Congress to enact the minimum coverage provision 
contained in ACA and discusses whether there must be exceptions to a requirement to purchase 
health insurance based on First Amendment freedom of religion. It finally examines some of the 
legal challenges to this federal requirement as well as other questions (relating to the Anti-
Injunction Act and severability) that the Supreme Court is considering in conjunction with the 
minimum coverage provision. For a discussion of the constitutional challenge to ACA’s 
expansion of the Medicaid program, see CRS Report R42367, Federalism Challenge to Medicaid 
Expansion Under the Affordable Care Act: Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, 
by Kenneth R. Thomas. 
Background 
Under Section 1501 of ACA, beginning in tax year 2014, some taxpayers will be assessed a 
monetary penalty for any months during which they or their dependents lack “minimum 
essential” health coverage.4 “Minimum essential coverage” includes coverage under a 
government-sponsored health care program (e.g., Medicaid, Part A of Medicare); an “eligible” 
employer-sponsored plan; coverage under a plan offered in the individual market; a grandfathered 
health plan; and other health coverage as recognized by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services. 
The amount of the assessment for failing to meet the individual mandate, which can be prorated 
for partial compliance during the year, is determined by taking the greater of a flat dollar amount 
                                                 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148, §1501(b) (2010), as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 P.L. 111-152 §1002 (2010). The requirement to purchase health insurance will 
be referred to interchangeably, as either the minimum coverage provision or the individual mandate. 
2 See Congressional Budget Office Memorandum, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health 
Insurance (August 1994) (“A mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance would be an 
unprecedented form of federal action.”).  
3 See Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, Legal Solutions in Health Care 
Reform, available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/38108.3693.constitutionality.mandates.pdf. See also Ex Parte 
Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933) (Court agreed that a district court’s dismissal of a complaint alleging that Massachusetts’ 
compulsory automobile liability insurance law violated the 14th Amendment was proper “in view of the decisions of 
this Court bearing upon the constitutional authority of the State, acting in the interest of public safety, to enact the 
statute assailed.”). It should be noted that while laws related to military service (e.g., the draft) could be considered an 
example of a federal mandate pertaining to individuals, the authority for these laws likely relies on Congress’s authority 
to raise and support armies. See generally Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 
U.S. 366 (1918). 
4 P.L. 111-148, §1501(b), as amended by P.L. 111-152, §1002.  
A 
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and a calculation based on a percentage of the taxpayer’s household income. The annual flat 
dollar amount is assessed per individual or dependent without coverage and will be phased in 
over three years. The amount is set at $95 for 2014; $325 for 2015; and $695 in 2016 and 
thereafter.5 This amount will also be adjusted for inflation beyond 2016. Although this is a fixed 
per-person amount, a taxpayer’s liability will not exceed three times this amount per year, 
regardless of the number of individuals who actually lack adequate coverage during the year. For 
example, a married couple filing jointly with two dependent children and no health insurance will 
have the same flat dollar assessment as a similarly situated married couple with three dependent 
children. 
This flat dollar amount will be compared to a percentage of the extent to which the taxpayer’s 
household income exceeds the income tax filing threshold.6 Like the flat dollar amount, the 
applicable percentage to be used is phased in over three years, set at 1% for 2014, 2% for 2015, 
and 2.5% thereafter. The amount assessed on a taxpayer who lacks minimum essential coverage 
will be equal to the greater of the flat dollar amount or the calculated percentage of household 
income. However, this amount shall not exceed the national average of the annual premiums of a 
bronze level health insurance plan offered through an exchange created under ACA. 
Exemptions would apply to individuals with qualified religious exemptions, members of health 
care sharing ministries, unauthorized aliens, incarcerated individuals, qualified U.S. citizens and 
residents living abroad, and bona fide residents of the U.S. possessions. Additionally, no amounts 
would be assessed on individuals who could not afford coverage;7 taxpayers with income less 
than the filing threshold; members of Indian tribes; and individuals granted hardship exceptions. 
Finally, no amounts would be assessed for periods without coverage that last less than three 
months. This three-month exception could apply to only one continuous period without coverage 
during a calendar year. 
Constitutional Authority to Require an Individual 
to Have Health Insurance 
While there is no specific enumerated constitutional power to regulate health care or establish a 
minimum coverage provision, one can look to Congress’s other broad enumerated powers which 
have been used to justify health care regulation in the past. In the instant case, Congress’s taxing 
power or its power to regulate interstate commerce may be pertinent. It should be noted that while 
there are numerous congressional findings under Section 1501 of ACA that address the 
correlation of the minimum coverage provision to interstate commerce, there are no similar 
statements in the Act relating to the individual mandate and Congress’s taxing power. 
                                                 
5 The tax would be one half the applicable dollar amount if the taxpayer was younger than 18 years old.  
6 The filing threshold for individuals is defined in I.R.C. §6012(a)(1) and is roughly equal to the taxpayer’s personal 
exemption (or exemptions in the case of a joint filer) and standard deduction. 
7 In general, an individual will be deemed unable to afford coverage if the required contribution for employer-
sponsored coverage or a bronze-level plan on an Exchange exceeds 8% of the individual’s household income for the 
taxable year. See 26 U.S.C. §5000A(e)(1)(A), as created by ACA. For information on Exchanges as provided for in 
ACA, see CRS Report R40942, Private Health Insurance Provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA), by Hinda Chaikind and Bernadette Fernandez. 
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Taxing Power 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that “Congress shall have Power To lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States.... ” The power to tax and spend for the general welfare is 
one of the broadest powers in the Constitution and affords the basis of government health 
programs in the Social Security Act, including Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program. 
Because Congress’s power to tax is extremely broad,8 it has been argued that this power is a 
legitimate source of power for Congress to impose the minimum coverage provision. If so, the 
provision might be upheld as constitutional so long as it was found to comply with the 
constitutional restrictions imposed on direct and indirect taxes discussed below. In defense of the 
individual mandate, the Solicitor General has favorably compared the requirement to other 
instances in which Congress has used its taxing authority to create financial incentives for 
individuals to purchase health insurance.9 Similarly, if Congress were to require individuals to 
purchase health insurance, and then encourage compliance with this requirement by conditioning 
receipt of a tax benefit (e.g., a tax credit) on the purchase of health insurance, this incentive also 
could be seen as a legitimate exercise of Congress’s taxing authority.10 
On the other hand, opponents of the minimum coverage provision have argued that the enacted 
requirement differs in that it creates a financial disincentive for failing to obtain health insurance. 
As the tax is imposed conditionally and may be avoided by compliance with regulations set out in 
the statute, some might argue that it may also be accurately described as a penalty and, therefore, 
the taxing power alone might not provide Congress the constitutional authority to impose the 
requirement.11 A court analyzing this argument might look to cases where the Supreme Court has 
examined whether Congress has the authority, independent of its taxing authority, to regulate the 
underlying subject matter. If such regulation is authorized under a provision of the Constitution 
other than the taxing power, the exaction may be sustained as an appropriate enforcement 
mechanism.12 But, in the absence of such independent authority, a tax triggered by the failure to 
comply with federal standards has been held to be invalid.13 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93 (1919) (“If the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation 
to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed 
motives which induced it.”). 
9 See Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, 55 HHS v. Florida (2012) (No. 11-398) (citing I.R.C. §106 which excludes 
compensation received by employees in the form of health care benefits from gross income). 
10 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 550 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) (If Congress 
clearly intended to enact a tax, it would simplify the court’s role “as it is easy to envision a system of national health 
care, including one with a minimum-essential-coverage provision, permissibly premised on the taxing power.”). 
11 But see Brian D. Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health Care Reform (April 3, 2010). Yale 
Law Journal Online, Forthcoming; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper; GWU Law School Public Law 
Research Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1584044 (arguing “‘conditional’ taxes—taxes used to 
achieve some regulatory end—are not limited only to those purposes covered by Congress’s other enumerated powers. 
Instead, Congress may condition exemptions from a tax on any criteria it chooses—other than those expressly 
prohibited by the Constitution, such as restrictions on free speech—so long as it is willing to pay the political price for 
carving out that exception.”). 
12 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 383 (1940) (a tax on coal producers who did not meet certain 
federal requirements was upheld because the imposition of federal requirements was a valid exercise of Congress’ 
power to regulate interstate commerce). 
13 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (striking tax on the employment of children because regulation of child 
(continued...) 
Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 
 
Congressional Research Service 4 
A court that found it necessary to determine whether the character of the minimum coverage 
payment is that of a tax or penalty would likely examine congressional intent. The Supreme Court 
has noted that: 
the difference between a tax and a penalty is sometimes difficult to define and yet the 
consequences of the distinction in the required method of their collection often are 
important.... Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the legislature on proper 
subjects with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the incidental 
motive of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous. They do not lose their 
character as taxes because of the incidental motive. But there comes a time in the extension 
of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes 
a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.14 
Here, enforcement of this provision would likely result in revenue for the federal government, 
and a court might find this to be a sufficient purpose to be a valid exercise of the taxing power. 
But, it may be difficult for a court to ignore the larger context of health insurance reform in which 
the provision has arisen. To the extent that this context indicates that a primary motive of the 
provision is to encourage compliance with a federal requirement that individuals maintain some 
form of health insurance, a court may characterize it as a penalty rather than a tax. 
For example, a court might look to any legislative findings accompanying the minimum coverage 
provision. Notably, Congress found that: 
[t]he [minimum coverage] requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic in 
nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and 
when health insurance is purchased.15 
The language Congress itself uses to refer to the provision may also influence its characterization. 
On one hand, simply because Congress has labeled a provision as a tax, a court is not bound by 
that label.16 However, neither would a court be prohibited from using Congress’s description of 
the provision as a penalty as evidence of Congress’s intent. 
Other factors can be gleaned from the Court’s jurisprudence distinguishing taxes and penalties. 
Factors which suggest that a provision might actually be a penalty include (1) the absence of a 
correlation between the amount of tax and the magnitude by which an individual’s conduct 
deviates from the conduct which is exempt from taxation; (2) a limitation that the tax only falls 
on individuals who knowingly deviate from the exempt conduct; and (3) the possibility of 
enforcement by government entities not traditionally charged with the enforcement of taxes.17 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
labor was not within Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause at the time; Congress’ authority under the 
Commerce Clause has since been recognized by the Supreme Court to be much broader). 
14 Id. at 38 (emphasis added). 
15 See P.L. 111-148, §1501(a)(2)(A). 
16 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38 (“To give such magic to the word “tax” would be to break down all 
constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States.”). 
17 Id. at 36-37 (“In the light of these features of the act, a court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed 
to stop the employment of children within the age limits prescribed. Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose 
are palpable. All others can see and understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?”). 
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Application of these three factors to the instant provision would appear to support its 
characterization as a tax. First, the amount of the penalty is roughly proportional to the length of 
time during the year that the taxpayer and his or her dependents lacked coverage. Second, 
knowledge is not a necessary element to assess the penalty. Third, it appears that the provision 
will be enforced by the Internal Revenue Service, an entity traditionally charged with the 
enforcement of taxes. However, this list comprises only those factors the Court found present in 
the case before it, and may not represent an exhaustive list of what a court might consider as 
indicia of taxes. 
If a court were to classify the provision as a penalty, this would not be determinative of its 
constitutional validity, but would merely establish that Congress’s authority to enact such a 
provision must be found in something other than its power to levy taxes. In other words, the 
constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision, if determined to be a penalty, would depend 
upon whether Congress has the authority under a power other than the taxing power to impose a 
financial burden on individuals who lack health insurance. As discussed below, one potential 
source of such authority may be the Commerce Clause. 
Limits on the Taxing Power 
Even where Congress has the general authority to levy a tax, the Constitution may impose 
additional requirements on the form of such taxes. For constitutional purposes,18 taxes are 
understood to be either: 
• direct taxes, subject to apportionment among the states based on population,19 or  
• indirect taxes (i.e., duties, imposts, and excises), subject to the Uniformity 
Clause.20 
Additionally, under the Sixteenth Amendment, taxes on income, from whatever source, are not 
required to be apportioned,21 even if such taxes are direct. The amendment itself does not classify 
income taxes as direct or indirect. 
Here, it appears the minimum coverage provision would raise constitutional concerns under these 
provisions only if it were found to be a direct tax that was not a tax on income. This is because it 
would then be subject to the requirement of apportionment, and there is no indication it will be 
apportioned among the states based on population. If, however, the requirement were found to be 
a tax on income, it would fall under the protection of the Sixteenth Amendment and its lack of 
apportionment would raise no constitutional concerns. Similarly, it appears no constitutional 
issues would arise if the requirement were found to be an indirect tax since it would appear to 
satisfy the requirement of uniformity since it is geographically neutral on its face.22 
                                                 
18 See Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 370 (1904) (“And these two classes, [direct taxes], and ‘duties, imposts 
and excises,” apparently embrace all forms of taxation contemplated by the Constitution.”). 
19 U.S. CONST. Art. 1, §9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or 
Enumeration….”); Art. 1, §2, cl. 3 (“direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States….”).  
20 U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8, cl. 1 (“[A]ll duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”). 
21 U.S. CONST. Amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever 
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”). 
22 See United States v. Ptasynski, 461 U.S. 74 (1983) (stating the Uniformity Clause bars geographic discrimination). 
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Some have argued that the minimum coverage provision is in fact a direct tax, and, consequently, 
must be apportioned. The exact scope of the term “direct taxes” is undetermined, but the Court 
has construed it to be relatively narrow. The Constitution does not define the term other than 
specifying that it includes capitations (a capitation, or head tax, is a fixed tax imposed on each 
person in a jurisdiction). The Framers’ debates provide little clarity.23 From its earliest days, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that direct taxes include capitations and real property taxes at a 
minimum.24 The Court has also suggested that other types of taxes might be considered direct,25 
although the Court did not find any such examples26 until the Pollock case in 1895. In Pollock, 
the Court struck down the unapportioned Income Tax Act of 189427 after finding parts of it—the 
taxes on income from real and personal property—were direct taxes.28 The Pollock decision was 
subject to substantial criticism and led to the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. 
Pollock has not been expressly overruled,29 although the Court moved away from its analysis in 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., 2 Farrand’s Records 350 (“Mr. King asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation? No one 
answd.”). Primary sources from the time period have supported multiple interpretations, from narrow definitions 
limiting direct taxes to only those that can realistically be apportioned, perhaps just capitation and real property taxes, 
to broader interpretations that would, for example, include all taxes other than consumption taxes. See, e.g., Bruce 
Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14-19 (1999) (arguing that “direct tax” was primarily 
a political, and not economic, term intended to be interpreted narrowly); Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the 
Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057 (2001) (arguing that the Framers 
distinguished the two types on the basis that indirect taxes—which he thinks means taxes on consumption—have 
inherent protection from government abuse because taxpayers can choose whether to consume if the tax gets too high). 
24 Congress has in the past levied taxes on property. In 1813, Congress levied a direct tax on property totaling $3 
million, which the statute apportioned among the 18 states and then among the counties (parishes) of each state. Act of 
August 2, 1813, 2 Stat. 53. Thus, for example, $369,018.44 was apportioned to Virginia and $6,354.50 of that amount 
apportioned to Fairfax County. Provisions for assessing and collecting the tax were contained in the Act of July 22, 
1813. 3 Stat. 22 (1813). A direct tax on property totaling $20 million was levied in 1861, apportioned among the states, 
territories, and the District of Columbia. Act of August 5, 1861, §8, 12 Stat. 295. We have found no examples of head 
taxes enacted by Congress. 
25 See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796). But, see id. at 175 (Chase, J., concurring, “I am inclined to think, but 
of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a 
capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstances; and a tax on land”) 
(emphasis added). 
26 See Hylton, 3 U.S. at 175 (upholding unapportioned tax on carriages); Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433 
(1869) (upholding tax on the business of insurance); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869) (upholding tax on bank 
notes); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331 (1875) (upholding inheritance tax); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881) 
(upholding income tax).  
27 28 Stat. 509 (1894) (imposing a tax on “the gains, profits, and income received in the preceding calendar year by 
every citizen of the United States ... whether said gains, profits, or income be derived from any kind of property, rents, 
interest, dividends, or salaries, or from any profession, trade, employment, or vocation carried on in the United States 
or elsewhere.... ”). 
28 The Court reasoned that income taxes on the gains derived from investments in real or personal property had a 
substantial impact on the underlying assets and should be treated as direct taxes falling on the property. See Pollock, 
157 U.S. at 583. 
29 Some commentators would argue the decision has essentially been erased by the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence 
and passage of the Sixteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the 
Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 298-99 (2004) (“Pollock is dead on its holding as to the 
income tax. Indeed, courts have a duty to distinguish Pollock in every case.”). On the other hand, some have argued 
that “the reports of Pollock’s demise are exaggerated” and that “[a]n income tax is nothing like the classic forms of 
indirect taxation, and the Supreme Court therefore got the result right in [Pollock]: an income tax is a direct tax as that 
term was originally understood.” Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes 
Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2345 (1997); Jensen, supra note 23 at 1079. 
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subsequent cases that upheld a variety of unapportioned taxes on the basis they were excise 
taxes.30 
The minimum coverage provision is codified in the Internal Revenue Code as an excise tax. For 
constitutional purposes, the Supreme Court has found excise taxes to be a broad category of 
indirect taxes.31 It might be argued, for example, that the tax is properly characterized as an excise 
tax imposed on earning income without maintaining health insurance for oneself and one’s 
dependents.32 Excise taxes imposed on inaction are not unprecedented,33 although it does not 
appear that any have been challenged on the grounds that it is unconstitutional to impose an 
excise tax on a failure to act.  
On the other hand, some have argued that the individual mandate is a tax based on inaction and is 
effectively a capitation.34 Under this argument, “[a] tax on a person who chooses not to act is 
precariously close to a tax on everyone with an exemption from the tax for those that act.”35 In 
other words, a tax on the failure to act (i.e., buy health insurance) is essentially a tax on “the state 
of mere existence.”36 However, others might point to the fact that the tax would not be imposed 
on individuals with insufficient income as evidence that it should not be characterized as a 
capitation. Additionally, some might compare it to existing tax deductions and credits that are 
intended to encourage certain types of behaviors, such as the tax benefits provided to 
homeowners.37 It might be argued that the minimum coverage provision is analogous to these 
types of provisions, and the fact that it takes a different form (i.e., is not a deduction or credit) 
should not be constitutionally significant. 
Resolving this point may require determining whether a generally applicable tax that is avoidable 
if an individual takes some action constitutes a capitation. The federal courts have yet to explore 
in detail the precise definition of capitations, also known as poll taxes, for purposes of the federal 
Constitution. However, some insight into their meanings may be gleaned from the states’ attitudes 
regarding poll taxes which were held contemporaneously with the ratification of the federal 
                                                 
30 See Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899) (tax on certain sales and exchanges of property); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 
U.S. 41 (1900) (estate tax); Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 609 (1902) (tax on manufactured tobacco); Flint v. Stone Tracy 
Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (corporate franchise tax); but see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (striking an 
unapportioned tax on a stock dividend that did not change the taxpayer’s proportionate ownership of the company, 
relying on the Pollock holding that taxes on rents and income from real and personal property were direct taxes). 
31 See Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899) (tax on certain sales and exchanges of property); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 
U.S. 41 (1900) (estate tax); Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 609 (1902) (tax on manufactured tobacco); Flint v. Stone Tracy 
Co., 220 U.S. 108 (1911) (tax on corporate franchise). 
32 See also Galle, supra note 11 (arguing the tax could be characterized as imposed on “the use of personal wealth for 
purposes other than the purchase of health insurance” or “on a particular form of arranging one’s economic affairs: the 
choice to shift the risk of future medical needs from oneself to the social safety net—in effect, a tax on the use of the 
existing system of free care, Medicaid, and debtor-protection and bankruptcy law”). 
33 Other provisions include the excise taxes on the failure of tax-exempt private foundations to distribute income (26 
U.S.C. §4942); failures of certain group health plans to provide continuation coverage or to meet certain requirements 
(26 U.S.C. §§4980B, 4980D) and failures of certain investment vehicles to distribute income (26 U.S.C. §§4981, 
4982). 
34 See George Clark, Baucus “Excise” on Those Who Fail to Buy Insurance Raises Constitutional Issues, DAILY TAX 
REPORT, September 29, 2009. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §163(h) (permitting individuals to deduct qualifying home mortgage interest payments); 26 
U.S.C. §36 (providing a tax credit to qualifying “first-time” homebuyers). 
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Constitution. For example, in Short v. State the Maryland Court of Appeals was confronted with 
the meaning of poll taxes for purposes of the state constitution. At the time of the case in 1895, 
every Maryland state constitution since 1776 had prohibited poll taxes.38 Maryland had also 
required, at least since 1795, that all able-bodied state male residents either spend two days a year 
improving the road system or pay seventy-five cents for road maintenance. Based upon 
approximately one hundred years of coexistence between these two provisions, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals determined that the meaning of poll taxes, as used in the state constitution in 
1776, did not encompass the financial penalty imposed on those who failed to perform road 
maintenance.39 A potential inference from this holding is that, at the time the Constitution was 
drafted, the common understanding of poll taxes did not encompass a financial penalty imposed 
on the failure to satisfy a lawful obligation to take some action. Therefore, while Congress’s 
authority to impose the underlying mandate may be challenged, it is far from certain that a tax on 
individuals who fail to comply with that mandate would be a capitation necessitating 
apportionment. 
If the minimum coverage provision is classified as a tax on income, whether the tax is direct or 
not becomes irrelevant as it would no longer be subject to apportionment by virtue of the 
Sixteenth Amendment. Certain aspects of the tax might support its classification as a tax on 
income since, for taxpayers with sufficient income, the amount of taxation would be directly 
proportional to their excess household income above the filing threshold and only those taxpayers 
with household income above the filing threshold would be subject to the tax at all. However, it is 
not clear that a court would classify the minimum coverage provision as a tax on income since a 
significant component of the tax appears to have no relationship to a taxpayer’s income, but is 
instead related to the lack of coverage under a health plan for themselves and their dependents. 
Supreme Court Review 
Before the Supreme Court, the Administration argues that the minimum coverage provision could 
be independently justified under the taxing power.40 In support of the provision’s characterization 
as a tax, the Administration notes that the mandate is expected to raise substantial revenue, is 
placed in the IRC, and is to be assessed and collected by the IRS.41 Although the Administration 
acknowledges that the minimum essential coverage requirement is intended to affect individual 
behavior with respect to purchasing insurance, it argues that the Court’s precedent has established 
that “[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory” and that the critical inquiry is whether the 
measure is “productive of some revenue.”42 Additionally, the Administration argues that the 
individual mandate’s designation as a “penalty” should not be determinative of the provision’s 
characterization as a tax, particularly given its function as a revenue raising provision.  
In opposition, the respondents before the Supreme Court principally argue that the minimum 
coverage provision should not be evaluated under the taxing power principally because the 
minimum essential coverage requirement contains a stand-alone provision directing individuals to 
                                                 
38 Md. December of R. art. 15. 
39 31 A. 322 (Md. 1895). Examples of poll taxes recited in the opinion were a specific sum levied on all persons, male 
or female, free or slave, above the age of 16 for general support of the government and a tax of 40 pounds of tobacco 
“per poll” to support clergy of the Church of England. 
40 See Brief for Petitioner at 52-62, HHS v. Florida (2012) (No. 11-398). 
41 Id. 
42 United States v. Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (upholding license tax on firearms dealers). 
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maintain health insurance, and that this mandate cannot be justified under the taxing power even 
if the penalty imposed on individuals that do not satisfy that mandate could be.43 Additionally, the 
respondents rely on the fact that Congress chose to explicitly refer to the provision as a penalty 
rather than as a tax.44 Finally, the respondents alternatively argue that, even if the provision is 
appropriately characterized as a tax, it may be an unconstitutionally un-apportioned capitation. 
Power to Regulate Commerce 
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”45 The Supreme 
Court developed an expansive view of the Commerce Clause relatively early in the history of 
judicial review.46 This power has been cited as the constitutional basis for a significant portion of 
the laws passed by the Congress over the last 50 years, and it currently represents one of the 
broadest bases for the exercise of congressional powers.47 While the Supreme Court held in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association48 that Congress could regulate the 
competitive practices of insurers under the Commerce Clause, it is unclear whether the minimum 
coverage provision could be considered regulation of insurance per se. Despite the breadth of 
powers that have been exercised under the Commerce Clause, whether the minimum coverage 
provision would be constitutional under the clause is a challenging question, as it is a novel issue 
whether Congress may use the clause to require an individual to purchase a good or a service. 
Under modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has found that the Commerce 
Clause allows for three categories of congressional regulation: the channels of interstate 
commerce; the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and “those activities having a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.”49 It is likely that a court would evaluate Congress’s authority for enacting the 
minimum coverage provision under this third “substantially affects” category. 
                                                 
43 Brief for Respondents at 52-54, HHS v. Florida (2012) (No. 11-398). 
44 Id. at 57-62. 
45 U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3. It should be noted that the Commerce Clause is augmented by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, which allows Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
the foregoing Powers ... ” U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 18. 
46 For instance, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 1824 that “the power over commerce ... is vested in Congress as 
absolutely as it would be in a single government ...” and that “the influence which their constituents possess at 
elections, are ... the sole restraints” on this power. Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197-98 (1824). 
47 See CRS Report RL32844, The Power to Regulate Commerce: Limits on Congressional Power, by Kenneth R. 
Thomas. 
48 322 U.S. 533 (1944). In response to the Court’s ruling in South-Eastern Underwriters, Congress explicitly 
recognized the role of the states in the regulation of insurance with the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945. 
The intent of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to grant states the explicit authority to regulate insurance in light of the 
South-Eastern Underwriters decision. Section 2(a) of the Act states: The business of insurance, and every person 
engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such 
business. 15 U.S.C. §1012(a). However, under the Act, Congress also reserved to itself the right to enact federal 
statutes that “specifically” relate to “the business of insurance.” 15 U.S.C. §1012(b).  
49 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (internal citations omitted). 
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Three recent cases, United States v. Lopez, United States v. Morrison,50 and Gonzales v. Raich,51 
as well as several historical decisions such as Wickard v. Filburn,52 govern much of the current 
Commerce Clause analysis under the “substantially affects” category. These cases indicate that, 
while the modern interpretation of the Commerce Clause is broad, congressional authority is not 
without bounds.53 In a case that has been perceived as one of the Supreme Court’s most expansive 
Commerce Clause rulings, Wickard v. Filburn, the Court was asked to determine whether the 
clause permitted amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 affecting the production 
and consumption of homegrown wheat.54 In upholding the statute as constitutional, the Court held 
that economic activities, regardless of their nature, could be regulated by Congress if the activity 
exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce.55 Although the Court admitted that one 
family’s production alone would likely have a negligible impact on the overall price of wheat, if 
combined with other personal producers, the effect would be substantial enough to make the 
activity subject to congressional regulation.56 The Court concluded that Congress had a rational 
basis for its action and its belief that, in the aggregate, keeping homegrown wheat outside of 
federal regulation would have a substantial influence on interstate commerce. 
From 1937 to 1995, after cases like Wickard and others, the Supreme Court did not hold a federal 
statute to be beyond the scope of the authority vested in Congress by the Commerce Clause. 
However, in 1995, in United States v. Lopez, the Court struck down a statute that made it a federal 
crime to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone because it exceeded Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority. In analyzing the statute under the “substantially affects” category, the Court 
identified four major problems. First, it determined that the criminal statute at issue had no 
connection with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, and did not play an essential role 
in a larger regulatory scheme. Secondly, the Supreme Court found it significant that there was no 
jurisdictional element in the statute, which would ensure that firearm possession affected 
interstate commerce in a particular instance. Third, the Court stated that the lack of congressional 
findings regarding the impact of the offense on the national economy detracted from any 
substantial relation it might have to interstate commerce. Finally, the Court rejected the 
government’s argument that the statute was valid because possession of a firearm near a school 
could result in violent crime, and this crime could affect the national economy. The Court 
explained that if it were to accept the government’s arguments, it would be hard “to posit any 
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.”57 
The Supreme Court used the logic of Lopez in United States v. Morrison, where the Court 
evaluated whether a federal statute that provided for a private right of action for victims of 
gender-motivated violence fell within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. In finding 
that this statute was beyond Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, the Court followed 
the analysis in Lopez. First, the Court explained that “gender-motivated crimes are not, in any 
sense of the phrase, economic activity.” Turning to the second prong of the Lopez analysis, the 
                                                 
50 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
51 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
52 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
53 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608. 
54 In 1941, Mr. Filburn harvested an excess amount of 239 bushels for which he was fined pursuant to amendments to 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. 317 U.S. at 114. 
55 Id. at 125. 
56 Id. 
57 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. 
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Court noted that, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the statute lacked a “jurisdictional element 
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress’ power to regulate 
interstate commerce.”58 
The Court then discussed the existence of congressional findings regarding the effects of gender-
motivated violence on the national economy and interstate commerce. While noting that the 
statute was supported by “numerous findings,”59 the Court stressed its declaration in Lopez that 
“[s]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce does not necessarily make it so.” Finally, the Court considered the level of attenuation 
between the federal statute and its effect on interstate commerce. In explaining why the statute 
exceeded the boundaries of the Commerce Clause, the Court explained that the statute would 
impermissibly provide Congress with the power “to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, 
aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or 
consumption.”60 Expanding upon this observation, the Court noted that to allow such regulation 
of a non-economic activity would enable federal regulation of almost any activity, including 
“family law and other areas of traditional state regulation.... ”61 
In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court evaluated whether, under the Commerce Clause, 
Congress had the power to apply the federal Controlled Substances Act’s (CSA’s) prohibition of 
the manufacture and possession of marijuana to the local cultivation and use of marijuana that 
was in compliance with California law. In holding that the CSA’s prohibition was within 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, the Court relied on Wickard v. Filburn and the 
idea that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not “commercial” if it concludes 
that failure to regulate the activity would undercut federal regulation of the interstate market.62 
However, the Court found that the standard for assessing the scope of Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause is not whether the activity at issue, when aggregated, substantially affects 
interstate commerce; but rather, whether there exists a “rational basis” for Congress to have 
reached that conclusion. Further, the Court distinguished Raich from Lopez and Morrison based 
on the idea that in Raich, the regulated activity was “quintessentially economic.”63 The Court also 
concluded that Congress had acted rationally in determining that the CSA’s prohibition of the 
class of activities at issue was an “an essential part of the larger regulation of economic 
activity.”64 
                                                 
58 Morrison, 529 U.S at 613. 
59 The Court pointed to various legislative findings including findings that gender-motivated violence affected interstate 
commerce by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in interstate business, by diminishing 
national productivity, and increasing medical and other costs. Id. at 615 (quoting H.Rept. 103-711, at 385). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. It should be noted that after the decision in Lopez and Morrison, the question arose as to whether these cases were 
an indicator of future restrictions on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. However, it is arguable that the 
Court intended Lopez and Morrison to have a limited effect, as the Court specifically reaffirmed much of its previous 
Commerce Clause case law, including Wickard. 
62 Raich, 545 U.S. at 18. 
63 Id. at 25. The Court explained that “the CSA regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities 
for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture 
of an article of commerce is a rational ... means of regulating commerce in that product.” Id. at 26. 
64 Id. at 26-27. See also Lopez, 514 U.S., at 561. 
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In applying the 4-factor analysis used in Lopez and Morrison to the minimum coverage provision 
of ACA,65 the first and fourth factors of these cases warrant the closest analysis. Under the first 
factor of the test, it must be determined whether requiring individuals to purchase health 
insurance is commercial or economic in nature. In Lopez, the gun control law at issue was struck 
down by the Supreme Court, as was a cause of action based on gender-motivated crime in 
Morrison, because the statutes did not have anything to do with an economic activity or 
enterprise. While the regulation of the health insurance industry or the health care system would 
likely be considered economic in nature, a requirement to purchase health insurance is more of an 
open question. On one hand, for example, it is argued that the individual mandate regulates 
economic conduct, as the provision dictates the way in which individuals pay for their 
participation in the health care market.66 It is claimed that virtually all individuals participate in 
this market, since they will utilize health care services at some point. And, because uninsured 
individuals may seek and receive medical care, which they may not be able to pay for, the costs 
for this care are passed on to other market participants, i.e., health care providers, insurers, and 
the insured.67 Accordingly, the minimum coverage provision prevents this cost shifting and 
regulates how this health care is purchased.68 
On the other hand, it is argued that the minimum coverage provision goes beyond the bounds of 
the Commerce Clause, as regulation of the health insurance industry or the health care system 
could be considered economic activity, but regulating a choice to purchase health insurance is 
not.69 It is questioned whether a requirement to purchase health insurance is really a regulation of 
an economic activity or enterprise, if individuals who would be required to purchase health 
insurance are not, but for this regulation, a part of the health insurance market.70 In general, 
Congress has used its authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate individuals, employers, 
and others who voluntarily take part in some type of economic activity. While in Wickard and 
Raich, the individuals were participating in their own home activities (i.e., producing wheat for 
home consumption and cultivating marijuana for personal use), they were acting of their own 
volition, and this activity was determined to be economic in nature and affected interstate 
commerce. However, a requirement could be imposed on some individuals who do not engage in 
any economic activity relating to the health insurance market. This is a novel issue: whether 
Congress can use its Commerce Clause authority to require a person to buy a good or a service 
and whether this type of required participation can be considered economic activity. Still, while it 
may seem to many like too much of a bootstrap to force individuals into the health insurance 
market and then use their participation in that market to say they are engaging in commerce, there 
is plenty of evidence that the purchase of health insurance has an effect on the commerce of the 
                                                 
65 As discussed above, after Lopez and Morrison, whether a regulation has a substantial effect on interstate commerce 
requires reviewing courts to consider the following four factors: (1) whether the regulated activity is commercial or 
economic in nature; (2) whether an express jurisdictional element is provided in the statute to limit its reach; (3) 
whether Congress made express findings about the effects of the activity on interstate commerce; and (4) whether the 
link between the activity and the effect on interstate commerce is attenuated. United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 
1136-37 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12). 
66 See Brief for Appellant-Petitioner at 18-19, HHS v. Florida (2012) (No. 11-398). 
67 See id. 
68 Id. 
69 See e.g., Brief for Appellee-Respondent at 15 et seq, HHS v. Florida (2012) (No. 11-398). 
70 See, e.g., id. 
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nation. For example, in 2009, health care expenditures in the United States grew 4% to $2.5 
trillion, or $8,086 per person, and accounted for 17.6% of gross domestic product.71  
In evaluating whether the individual mandate and the effect on interstate commerce is attenuated, 
one may point to evidence of the effect that the requirement to purchase health insurance would 
have on the insurance industry and the health care system as a whole. One could argue that 
because most individuals do, at some point, become ill and require health care, a requirement that 
all persons purchase health insurance coverage would benefit the orderly flow of health care 
services in interstate commerce. As pointed out in the findings accompanying the minimum 
coverage provision, the requirement regulates activity such as “the economic and financial 
decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased. In 
the absence of the requirement, some individuals would make an economic and financial decision 
to forego health insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure, which increases financial risks to 
households and medical providers.”72 Also, because one of the motivating factors for a 
requirement to obtain health insurance is arguably to get healthy individuals who do not have 
health insurance to purchase it (so as to offset the cost of the individuals who need greater, more 
expensive care), this also would contribute to the proper functioning of the health care system. 
Still, it is argued that if the commerce power can be used to mandate the purchases of a private 
individual, it could be perceived as virtually unlimited in scope.73 Based on similar arguments 
made in Lopez and Morrison, a court may examine whether Congress can require the purchase of 
any good or service based on the effect such purchases could have on an industry or the economy 
as a whole. 
Also, while perhaps not as important to the instant inquiry as the other Lopez/Morrison factors, 
the presence of congressional findings for purposes of commerce clause analysis may be 
examined. ACA includes detailed findings regarding the effect that the minimum coverage 
provision would have on interstate commerce.74 However, as mentioned above, it appears that the 
presence of congressional findings may be helpful, but not determinative, of Congress’s authority 
to legislate under the Commerce Clause. In addition, as discussed in Lopez and Morrison, a court 
could also examine the fact that ACA does not contain an explicit jurisdictional element that 
insures that the statute affects interstate commerce. This element could have been satisfied by a 
statement, such as one providing that any person using medical care in or affecting interstate 
commerce must have health insurance. It is possible that a court may overlook the need for a 
jurisdictional element, especially in light of Congress’s findings that indicate the effects that the 
minimum coverage provision has on interstate commerce.75 However, should a reviewing court 
find that absence of a jurisdictional element as essential for Congress’s ability to enact the 
minimum coverage provision, it seems possible that Congress may be able to amend ACA to 
include this element.76 
                                                 
71 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Data Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/25_NHE_Fact_Sheet.asp. 
72 P.L. 111-148, §1501(a)(2). 
73 See e.g., Brief for Appellee-Respondent, HHS v. Florida at 24 et seq. 
74 P.L. 111-148, §1501(a)(2). 
75 Further, if a court finds the minimum coverage provision to be, similar to the provisions in Wickard and Raich, an 
essential component of a larger economic regulatory scheme, then the need for a jurisdictional element may be 
alleviated. See discussion of Raich infra. 
76 It may be noted that Congress replaced the provision struck down in Lopez with an amended version that makes it 
unlawful for an individual “knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or 
(continued...) 
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Following the reasoning of Raich, a court may evaluate whether Congress rationally concluded 
that persons failing to have health insurance have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. One 
arguing in favor of the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision may point to the fact 
that a health insurance mandate would presumably lower the uninsured population. Many suggest 
that Americans without health coverage burdens our health care system and adds strain on the 
economy. As indicated in the congressional findings accompanying the minimum coverage 
provision, the economy loses up to $207 billion a year because of the poorer health and shorter 
lifespan of the uninsured.77 Further, according to these findings, in 2008, cost of providing 
uncompensated care to the uninsured was $43 billion and these amounts are paid for when health 
care providers pass on the cost to private insurers, which in turn then transfer the cost to those 
who are insured.78 Evidence like this could be relied on by a court in demonstrating a rational 
basis for Congress’s enactment of a requirement to purchase health insurance. 
 In addition, based on Raich, if a requirement to purchase health insurance is not considered 
economic or commercial in nature, it should be determined whether the requirement is “an 
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity.” One may argue that a minimum 
coverage provision is an essential part of Congress’s current regulation of the health care system 
or industry. A reviewing court could consider whether the absence of a requirement to purchase 
health care would undercut the regulation of the health care as a whole. In making this 
determination, a court may look to the involvement of the federal government in the regulation of 
health care generally to decide whether a requirement to purchase health insurance could be seen 
as an essential component of this regulation. Given the federal government’s fairly significant 
role in health care regulation (e.g., ERISA, the Public Health Service Act), the argument that the 
requirement to purchase insurance is an “essential part” of the regulation may become more 
viable. In addition, since the minimum coverage provision is part of a comprehensive act dealing 
with many aspects of health care, this may reinforce the idea that it is acceptable under the 
Commerce Clause as part of a larger health care reform effort.79 
Further, because certain new insurance provisions in ACA require health insurers to accept every 
individual who applies for coverage, prevent them from imposing exclusions from coverage 
based on preexisting conditions, and restrict insurers from charging higher premiums based on an 
individual’s health status, some argue that the minimum coverage provision plays an integral role 
within ACA itself.80 Without an individual mandate, individuals might wait to purchase health 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” See 18 
U.S.C. §922(q)(2)(A) (emphasis added). This amendment demonstrates that the required nexus to interstate commerce 
can, at least in some cases, may be fixed. 
77 P.L. 111-148, §1501(a)(2)(E). 
78 P.L. 111-148, §1501(a)(2)(F). 
79 The Court has also suggested that challenges to non-commercial aspects of a larger economic regulatory scheme may 
be evaluated under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Raich, 545 U.S at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Congress’ 
authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws directed 
against economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”). Using this rationale, it could be 
argued that a requirement that individuals obtain health insurance is necessary for the proper functioning of the broader 
health care regulation established under ACA, so that such a mandate would pass constitutional muster. Id. at 22. The 
kinds of factors likely to be considered are (1) the historic breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause; (2) the history 
of federal involvement in this area; (3) the reason for the statute’s enactment; (4) the statute’s accommodation of state 
interests; and (5) whether the scope of the statute is too attenuated from Article I powers. United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949 (May 17, 2010). 
80 See, e.g., Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, HHS v. Florida at 17-18, 24-25. 
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insurance until they need care. As congressional findings point out, “[t]he [minimum coverage] 
requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health 
insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing 
conditions can be sold.”81 On the other hand, one could note that under Section 1501 of ACA, an 
individual could decide to pay the penalty associated with the minimum coverage provision and 
avoid purchasing health insurance. If a large number of individuals refused to purchase health 
insurance, this may weaken the idea that the minimum coverage provision is an essential part of 
this health care regulation. 
Supreme Court Review 
Arguments like the ones discussed above have been presented to the Supreme Court. In arguing 
their position to the Court, the challengers to the individual mandate contend that “[t]he 
Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate commerce, not the power to compel 
individuals to enter into commerce” or “the power to bring commerce into existence.”82 
Accordingly, it is argued that if the Court finds that the Commerce Clause allows Congress to 
enact such a requirement, this would be a vast expansion of legislative powers.83 And while the 
challengers concede that the decision to purchase health insurance could have economic 
consequences, they reason that “[i]f the “economic” nature of a decision were enough to allow 
Congress to displace the decision-making power of individuals and compel them to make 
whatever decisions Congress deems useful for the more efficient regulation of commerce, it 
would be ‘difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,’ or any ‘residuum of power’ 
reserved to the States.”84 Following this logic, the challengers claim, every decision not to 
purchase a good or a service could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce if they are 
aggregated with similar decisions made by other individuals, and thus Congress would be in a 
position to require the purchase of any product.85  
Conversely, the Administration primarily argues that the minimum coverage provision addresses 
the existing economic effects of the cost of care for the uninsured on the health care market.86 
Because the minimum coverage provision addresses “the timing and method of financing health 
care services,” and because health care regulation is an area of “pervasive federal involvement,” 
the Administration reasons that the requirement to purchase health insurance is well within the 
boundaries of the commerce power.87 The Administration also distinguishes the requirement to 
purchase health insurance from the requirement to purchase other products, due to the health 
insurance market’s unique characteristics, and the fact that “in markets for those [other] goods, 
there is no pre-existing economic activity analogous to the uncompensated consumption of health 
care, and thus no substantial economic effect like the massive risk-shifting and cost-shifting that 
                                                 
81 P.L. 111-148, §1501(a)(2). 
82 Brief for Appellee-Respondent, HHS v. Florida at 11, 15. (emphasis in original) (“If Congress not only can regulate 
individuals once they decide to enter into commerce, but can compel them to enter commerce in the first place, then 
there is nothing left of the principle that Congress’ powers “are defined, and limited,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 
176 (1803), as Congress could simply force within its regulatory reach all those who would remain outside it.”) Id. at 
11. 
83 See, e.g., id. at 24. 
84 Id. at 27 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; U.S. v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
85 Id. at 12-13. 
86 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2, HHS v. Florida (2012) (No. 11-398). 
87 Id. at 3. 
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occurs in the health-care and health-insurance markets.”88 The Administration also emphasizes 
that the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision is further established by the fact that 
it is “integral” to ACA’s insurance reforms, namely the guaranteed issue and community rating 
provisions, as the mandate is necessary to make these reforms effective.89 
Religious Exemptions to the Requirement to Have 
Health Insurance 
Requiring individuals to obtain health insurance may conflict with some individuals’ religious 
beliefs.90 Accordingly, legislation that would require individuals to obtain health insurance might 
raise constitutional issues of religious freedom.91 These issues may be addressed with a religious 
exemption to the minimum coverage provision, which must comport with the First Amendment’s 
religion clauses. Those clauses serve as guarantees that individuals will neither be required to act 
under a prescribed religious belief (the Establishment Clause) nor be prohibited from acting under 
their chosen religious beliefs (the Free Exercise Clause).  
Constitutional and Statutory Rules Regarding Religious Exercise 
Constitutional and statutory rules regarding free exercise of religion would determine whether a 
religious exemption would be required for legislation requiring individuals to have health 
insurance. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... ”92 Although the Supreme 
Court historically had applied a heightened standard of review to government actions that 
allegedly interfered with a person’s free exercise of religion,93 the Court reinterpreted that 
standard in 1990. Since then, the Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause never “relieve[s] an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability.”94 
Under this interpretation, the constitutional baseline of protection was lowered, meaning that laws 
that do not specifically target religion or do not allow for individualized assessments are not 
subject to heightened review under the Constitution. 
                                                 
88 Id. at 6. 
89 Id. at 3-4. See the severability section of this report, infra, for an additional discussion of the relationship of the 
individual mandate to the guaranteed issue and community rating provisions of ACA. 
90 Some religions teach that the religious community must be responsible for social services that otherwise might be 
included in health insurance coverage. The Amish, for example, believe that the community has an obligation to 
provide the assistance that would be provided by Medicare programs to community members in need of such 
assistance, and have challenged laws requiring their participation in such programs as unconstitutional. See United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Other religions teach that spiritual treatment through prayer, rather than medical 
treatment, is the appropriate method to treat ailments. See Christian Science, 1 Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion 
141 (Robert Wuthnow, ed., 2nd ed.) (2006). 
91 For background and legal analysis of religious exemptions in mandatory healthcare programs generally, see CRS 
Report RL34708, Religious Exemptions for Mandatory Health Care Programs: A Legal Analysis, by Cynthia 
Brougher. 
92 U.S. Const. Amend. I. For a discussion of constitutional and statutory standards of review used in relation to the First 
Amendment, see CRS Report RS22833, The Law of Church and State: General Principles and Current Interpretations, 
by Cynthia Brougher. 
93 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
94 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
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In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which statutorily 
reinstated the heightened standard of review for government actions interfering with a person’s 
free exercise of religion. Although the Court later struck down as unconstitutional portions of 
RFRA that applied to state and local governments, the heightened standard provided by RFRA 
still applies to federal government actions.95 RFRA provides that a statute or regulation of general 
applicability may lawfully burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it (1) furthers a 
compelling governmental interest, and (2) uses the least restrictive means to further that interest.96 
This two-part standard is sometimes referred to as strict scrutiny analysis. The Supreme Court has 
held that in order for the government to prohibit exemptions to generally applicable laws, the 
government must “demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform application of a particular 
program by offering evidence that granting the requested religious accommodations would 
seriously compromise its ability to administer the program.”97  
Legal Analysis of Religious Exemptions for the Minimum 
Coverage Provision 
Analysis of the issues raised by religious exemptions for the minimum coverage provision must 
address two questions: (1) whether the U.S. Constitution requires a religious exemption to ensure 
the free exercise rights of individuals who may have religious objections to health insurance; and 
(2) if a religious exemption is not constitutionally required, but included nonetheless, whether it 
would be constitutional under the First Amendment.  
Is a Religious Exemption Constitutionally or Statutorily Required? 
As a neutral law of general applicability that potentially burdens religious exercise, the minimum 
coverage provision would be subject to analysis under RFRA. Generally, it does not appear that a 
religious exemption is required for legislation mandating health coverage. The Supreme Court 
and other lower courts generally have allowed federal mandates that relate to public health, but 
nonetheless interfere with religious beliefs, to continue without exemptions.98 Under the strict 
scrutiny analysis, an exemption would be required only if the government does not have a 
compelling state interest that is achieved by the least restrictive means possible. 
One important goal for enacting the minimum coverage provision appears to be aimed at 
protecting public health. The government’s interest in protecting public health has been held to 
outweigh individuals’ religious interests. According to the Supreme Court, “the right to practice 
religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable 
                                                 
95 See City of Boerne, Texas v. Flores, 521 U.S. 407 (1997). Although RFRA currently applies as a general limitation 
on federal actions, Congress may amend its scope or may exempt future statutes from complying with RFRA. Under 
the long-standing legal principle of entrenchment, a legislative enactment cannot bind a future Congress. That is, 
Congress cannot entrench a legislative action by providing that it may not be repealed or altered. See Fletcher v. Peck, 
10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810) (Chief Justice Marshall). Thus, when considering proposed legislation that may conflict with 
requirements imposed by RFRA, Congress may avoid the conflict by exempting the legislation from RFRA. 
96 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(b). In some instances, RFRA may be preempted by another federal law. See S.Rept. 103-111, 
at 12-13 (1993). 
97 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unaio Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435-437 (2006). 
98 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927 (1964). 
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disease or the latter to ill health or death.”99 The Court delivered this decision before the Court 
applied a heightened standard of review to religious exercise cases, so it was not required to 
address whether the government’s interest was compelling. Nonetheless, the relative balance 
struck by the Court between the interests is significant, particularly if a healthcare proposal 
includes a requirement for children, but not adults. Health care legislation that requires coverage 
for children may face fewer obstacles in strict scrutiny analysis than legislation requiring 
coverage for all individuals in part because of the Court’s specific recognition that parents’ 
religious liberty does not trump the welfare of children and in part because of the general 
recognition that children’s interests are given heightened protection. In a decision that did apply 
heightened constitutional review, the Court held that the government’s interest in tax programs 
used to fund health insurance programs for low-income and aging portions of American society 
outweighs individuals’ interests in exercising their religion freely.100 The Court held that the 
government had a compelling interest in a uniform tax system that provided revenue for such 
governmental programs.101 The Court’s treatment of public health as an interest paramount to 
individual religious practice could indicate a compelling interest under RFRA. 
Although protecting public health through insurance programs appears to be a compelling 
governmental interest, the nature of the program that promotes public health may be significant to 
the analysis. The nature of the burden on religion may be significant when analyzing the 
constitutionality of a particular measure (e.g., the burden of a medical program that requires 
affirmative participation in medical procedures like vaccinations differs from that imposed by a 
financial program that requires payments to fund an insurance program like Medicaid). In the 
case of ACA, the minimum coverage provision is enforced through financial programs, meaning 
that the enacted legislation is more likely to avoid constitutional problems than a mandate for 
affirmative participation in medical programs. Depending on what is deemed to constitute public 
health, a court may find that requiring individuals to obtain health insurance does not rise to the 
same level of governmental interest as requirements that directly prevent the spread of disease. 
On one hand, it may be argued that health insurance coverage promotes productivity in society. 
Insurance coverage may encourage some individuals to seek medical treatment that they 
otherwise might forgo if they had to pay the full cost. By seeking treatment, these individuals 
may have prevented the spread of disease or may have improved their personal health to be more 
productive members of society. On the other hand, it may be argued that insurance coverage does 
not promote health because individuals are not guaranteed treatment. The minimum coverage 
provision does not require individuals to seek or accept treatment, and thus the effectiveness in 
promoting public health may be questioned. 
Even if the government has a compelling interest in requiring individual health insurance, it must 
use the least restrictive means to achieve that interest in order for the requirement to be upheld as 
constitutional. That is, the government must make the burden on religious exercise as narrow as 
possible. This test may be met by providing alternative means of compliance with the legislation, 
such as the exemption provided in ACA. Allowing individuals who object to the program on 
religious grounds and would not receive benefits from the program to opt out of coverage would 
likely satisfy both the individual’s free exercise of religion and the government’s interest in 
protecting public health at large. 
                                                 
99 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67. 
100 Lee, 455 U.S. at 260-61. 
101 Id. 
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Is a Religious Exemption Constitutionally Permissible? 
Even though an exemption may not be required by the Constitution, ACA’s exemption for those 
with religious objections provides an alternative for certain people based on their religious beliefs 
that is not available to other people who do not share the same religious beliefs. Thus, some 
individuals may claim that the religious exemption would violate the Establishment Clause by 
providing a benefit to groups based on religion. 
The Establishment Clause prohibits preferential treatment of one religion over another or 
preferential treatment of religion generally over nonreligion.102 Providing an exemption based on 
religion may be construed as favoring a particular religion or religion generally because only 
individuals with a religious affiliation would be eligible for the exemption. However, the mere 
fact that a law addresses religion does not automatically make that law unconstitutional. 
Traditionally, to be constitutional under Establishment Clause analysis, a government action must 
meet a three-part test known as the Lemon test. To meet the Lemon test, a law must (1) have a 
secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not 
lead to excessive entanglement with religion.103 The Supreme Court has upheld religious 
exemptions for government programs where the exemptions were enacted to prevent government 
interference with religious exercise.104 
Exemptions that are specifically available only to certain religions have been construed in some 
cases as a violation of the Establishment Clause.105 The religious conscience exemption in ACA 
does not state specific religious groups that would qualify for exemption. Rather, ACA exempts 
any individual who has been certified to be “a member of a recognized religious sect or division 
thereof described in section 1402(g)(1) [of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986] and an adherent 
of established tenets or teaching of such sect or division as described in such section.”106 Section 
1402(g)(1) provides an exemption from self-employment income tax if the individual seeking 
exemption: 
is a member of a recognized religious sect or division thereof and is an adherent of 
established tenets or teachings of such sect or division by reason of which he is 
conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any private or public insurance 
which makes payments in the event of death, disability, old-age, or retirement or makes 
payments toward the cost of, or provides services for, medical care....107 
Thus, the exemption is general, such that any member of any religious organization with the 
beliefs described in the provision would qualify. This construction of the exemption appears to 
                                                 
102 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968). 
103 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). While the first two prongs of the test are self-explanatory, the 
third prong prohibits “an intimate and continuing relationship” between government and religion as the result of the 
law. Id. at 621-22. The continuing viability of Lemon has been unclear as the Court has raised questions regarding its 
adequacy in analyzing these issues. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989). 
104 In Locke v. Davey, the Court recognized that some government actions that allow free exercise consequently raise 
questions of establishment, noting that there was room for “play in the joints” in this intersection of the religion 
clauses. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
105 See, e.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School District, 672 F. Supp. 81, 89-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
106 26 U.S.C. 5000A(d)(2)(A). 
107 26 U.S.C. §1402(g)(1). 
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conform with the constitutional requirements of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has 
held that legislation that provides protection or exemption for a specific religious group violates 
the Establishment Clause.108 The Court has held on numerous occasions that the government 
cannot provide special treatment to one religion over another, or religion generally over non-
religion.109 However, challenges have been made even to generally available religious exemptions 
under the Establishment Clause because such exemptions would provide preferential treatment to 
individuals with religious beliefs, but not to individuals who might object on nonreligious 
philosophical grounds to claim the exemption.110  
Although First Amendment issues are not at issue in the cases being reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, some legal challenges have included religious freedom claims, with at least one court 
addressing the merits of those claims.111 In that case, taxpayers claimed that the requirement 
violated RFRA by imposing a substantial burden on their religious exercise because obtaining 
health insurance would indicate a lack of trust as Christians that God would provide for their 
needs.112 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia noted that, according to the 
Supreme Court, a substantial burden would indicate that the government has substantially 
pressured an individual to modify his or her behavior in violation of his or her religious beliefs.113 
The court held that the burden imposed by the coverage requirement did not rise to the level of a 
substantial burden because there was insufficient evidence that the individuals would be 
pressured to modify their behavior and violate their beliefs. The court reasoned that the 
individuals could opt out of the coverage requirement by paying a shared responsibility 
requirement instead.114 Further, the court found the individuals “routinely contribute to other 
forms of insurance, such as Medicare, Social Security, and unemployment taxes, which present 
the same conflict with their belief that God will provide for their medical and financial needs.”115 
The court concluded that even if it had found a substantial burden on religious exercise, the 
coverage requirement nonetheless complied with RFRA. According to the court, the requirement 
served a compelling governmental interest in lowering health insurance premiums and improving 
access to health care through the least restrictive means, which provided individuals with a choice 
                                                 
108 U.S. CONST. amend I. See Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (invalidating the 
creation of a school district for one particular religious group). The Court has looked at whether the religious group 
alleged to be favored by the act in violation of the Establishment Clause is one of many religious groups eligible for 
similar treatment or if the special treatment is made through a series of benefits offered separately to multiple groups. 
Id. at 703-704. 
109 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-54 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); School Dist. of 
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216-217 (1963). 
110 See McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F.Supp. 2d 945 (W.D. Ark. 2002). 
111 See Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d 1. See also Liberty 
University v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4th Cir. 2011). 
112 Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, aff’d sub nom. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d 1. 
113 Id. at 42 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).  
114 Id. 
115 Id. As a general rule, without comparing the individual’s beliefs to those of other members of the same religious sect 
or considering the objective veracity of the beliefs, courts examine the individual’s beliefs to determine whether the 
belief is sincerely held or is being used as a false claim to avoid compliance with governmental regulation. If the 
individual does not consistently apply the belief in relevant life experiences (e.g., objecting to insurance coverage under 
ACA, but not under Medicare), a court may be less likely to recognize that a sincerely held belief is burdened. See, e.g., 
Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1123-25 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding a sincerely held objection to photo identification 
requirements after noting that the individual kept no photographs, television, paintings, or floral-designed furnishings 
in her home and even removed pictures from food containers).  
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between the minimum coverage provision or the shared responsibility requirement.116 On appeal, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion, agreeing “that 
appellants failed to allege facts showing that the mandate will substantially burden their religious 
exercise.”117 
Legal Challenges to the Minimum Coverage 
Provision 
In addition to the litigation mentioned in the previous section, several lawsuits have been filed 
challenging the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision. While these lawsuits are not 
identical in their complaints, they typically assert that the federal government does not have the 
authority to impose on individuals a requirement to purchase health insurance, and therefore seek 
declarative and injunctive relief. The Administration has filed motions to dismiss in these cases, 
arguing that the lawsuits are barred for procedural reasons because, among other things, the 
plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision, and that the issues asserted 
are not ripe for adjudication because the requirement does not take effect until 2014, and thus no 
injury to individuals could occur before then. The Administration has also contended that the 
requirement is well within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, General Welfare 
Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Plaintiffs’ success in challenging the minimum 
coverage provision has been mixed.118 So far, nine federal courts, including three appellate courts 
and six district courts, have rendered a decision on the constitutionality of the requirement. The 
three appellate courts evaluating the issue have reached contrasting conclusions.119 While three 
district courts have upheld the minimum coverage provision,120 three have struck it down.121 
Other courts have dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for procedural reasons, such as lack of standing to 
bring the action.122 Six petitions for Supreme Court review were filed in response to appellate 
decisions in the Eleventh, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits.123 On November 14, 2011, the Court agreed 
                                                 
116 Id. at 43. 
117 Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 5 fn. 4.  
118 Certain websites have been tracking the status of legal challenges to ACA. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, 
Defending the Affordable Care Act, available at http://www.justice.gov/healthcare/. See also Bara Vaida and Karl 
Eisenhower, Kaiser Health News, Scoreboard: Tracking Health Law Court Challenges, available at 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/March/02/health-reform-law-court-case-status.aspx.  
119 Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16806 (11th Cir. 2011); Thomas More 
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265 (6th Cir. 2011); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22566 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
120 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416 (October 7, 2010); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. 
Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922 (November 30, 2010); Mead v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592 (Dist. 
D.C. 2011). 
121 Goudy-Bachman v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102897 (September 13, 2011); Florida v. Department of Health 
and Human Services, Case No.: 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla., January 31, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius, No. 3:10cv188-HEH (E.D. Va., filed December 13, 2010). 
122 See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18632 (4th Cir. 2011); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. 
Geithner, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4th Cir. 2011); New Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, No. 10-4600 (3rd Cir. 
2011); Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10-56374 (9th Cir. 2011). 
123 Petitions for Supreme Court review of the minimum coverage provision and related briefs can be accessed on the 
Supreme Court’s website: http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/PPAACA.aspx.  
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to hear the appeals in the Florida case. 124 Oral arguments in this case took place during the last 
week of March. 
Eleventh Circuit: Florida v. HHS 
One of the most publicized of these lawsuits was filed on the same day that ACA was signed. 
Attorneys general in 13 states brought an action in the District Court of the Northern District of 
Florida against the Secretaries of Health and Human Services, Treasury, and Labor, seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief from its various requirements, including the minimum coverage 
provision.125 Certain individuals, the National Federation of Independent Business, and several 
other states later joined this lawsuit, and there are currently 26 state plaintiffs. The district court in 
Florida v. HHS held that the minimum coverage provision exceeds the powers of Congress under 
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, and struck down the law in its 
entirety. 126 On August 12, 2011, in a 2-1 ruling, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision that the minimum coverage provision exceeds Congress’s 
enumerated powers.127 However, unlike the lower court, the appellate court allowed the remaining 
provisions of ACA to stand. 
In assessing the constitutionality of the requirement to have health insurance under the Commerce 
Clause, the appeals court took a somewhat different approach in its reasoning than the district 
court. One of the district court’s primary reasons for invalidating the minimum coverage 
provision was that it was a regulation of inactivity, which the court found was not permitted under 
the Clause.128 However, the court of appeals concluded that the question to explore in this case is 
not whether the requirement was or was not “activity” that can be regulated under the Commerce 
Clause, but whether “the federal government can issue a mandate that Americans purchase and 
maintain health insurance from a private company for the entirety of their lives.”129 In order to 
answer this question, the court discussed certain characteristics of the minimum coverage 
provision that it found to be relevant. Among other things, it addressed the “unprecedented nature 
of the individual mandate.”130 The court indicated, for example, that Congress traditionally has 
used its Commerce Clause authority to promote commercial activity, rather than require it.131 The 
court also noted that the requirement to have health insurance is quite different from other types 
of personal mandates (e.g., registering for the draft, filing a tax return) in that it does not have a 
                                                 
124 The Court granted three petitions arising from this single case for review: National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, No. 11-393 (September 27, 2011); Florida v Department of Human Services, No. 11-400 
(September 27, 2011); and Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida, No. 11-398 (September 28, 2011). 
125 Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, Case No.: 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla., amended 
complaint filed May 14, 2010), available at http://healthreformgps.org/wp-content/uploads/Fla-v.-Sebelius.pdf. 
126 Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, Case No.: 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla., January 31, 
2011). 
127 Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16806 (11th Cir. 2011). 
128 Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, Case No.: 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT at 42 (The court opined that 
based on existing Commerce Clause precedent, it would be “a radical departure from existing case law to hold that 
Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.”) 
129 Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16806 at 161. 
130 Id. at 161-171. 
131 The appeals court provided the example of the Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. §4001 et seq.) as an 
illustration of this idea. Under as the court indicated, the act did not require the purchase of flood insurance, but rather 
created incentives to encourage the purchase of it. Id. at 165-66. 
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clear constitutional foundation, and does not require a citizen to interact with the government, but 
instead a private company.132  
Additionally, the court found that the individual mandate “lacks cognizable limits.”133 If an 
individual’s decision not to purchase health insurance could be regulated under the Commerce 
Clause, the court opined that this reasoning could apply to the purchase of any product, rendering 
the Clause unlimited in scope. The federal government had asserted that limits exist in applying 
the Commerce Clause to an economic mandate on individuals, and that a minimum coverage 
provision is within the acceptable limits because the health insurance and health care markets are 
unique (e.g., virtually everyone needs health care services at some point, and individuals receive 
services even if they cannot pay ).134 In rejecting this argument, the court indicated that using 
uniqueness as a limiting factor is not constitutionally relevant, and not judicially enforceable. As 
the court stated, accepting this principle “would lead to expansive involvement by the courts in 
congressional legislation, requiring us to sit in judgment over when the situation is serious 
enough to justify an economic mandate.”135 
The court explained that the requirement is also impermissibly over inclusive, as the requirement 
is not linked to health care consumption. The court pointed out that the requirement 
impermissibly regulates individuals beyond those who have not paid for their health care (e.g., 
those who have not entered the health care market), as well as those who will not consume health 
care until years later. In addition, the court determined that the minimum coverage provision 
“imperils our federalist structure.” The court discussed the role of the states with respect to health 
insurance and health care regulation, and noted that to allow Congress to enact this requirement in 
an area of traditional state concern “is a factor that strengthens the inference of a constitutional 
violation.”136 
The Eleventh Circuit also unanimously held that the individual mandate in ACA cannot be 
supported by Congress’s authority to levy taxes under the General Welfare Clause.137 In contrast 
with the court’s discussion of the Commerce Clause challenge, which largely examined the scope 
of Congress’s authority over interstate commerce in the abstract, the court’s analysis of the taxing 
power argument focused only on whether the text and history of ACA sufficiently evidence 
Congress’s intent to invoke its power to tax in this particular case. 
In order to reach the conclusion that Congress did not intend to enact a tax in the minimum 
coverage provision, the Eleventh Circuit placed heavy emphasis upon ACA’s form and, in 
particular, the words Congress itself used to describe the minimum coverage provision. 
Throughout Section 5000A of the IRC, the amount due under the minimum coverage provision is 
referred to as a “penalty” rather than as a “tax.”138 The court also relied on the text of the 
legislative findings accompanying Section 5000A, which cites Congress’s authority over 
                                                 
132 Id. at 169. 
133 Id. at 240. 
134 Id. at 185.  
135 Id. at 236. 
136 Id. at 221. 
137 Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16806, slip op. 172-189 (11th Cir. 
August 12, 2011) (tax holding joined by all judges). 
138 26 U.S.C. §5000A. 
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interstate commerce as a source of constitutional authority, and which describes the goal of the 
provision as achieving near universal health insurance coverage, rather than raising revenue.139  
The organizational structure of ACA was also found to be relevant; the court noted that ACA 
contained a number of other revenue raising provisions that were set off in a separate revenue title 
of the act. These revenue provisions were also explicitly described as taxes. In the court’s view 
this was further evidence that Congress did not intend to use its taxing power to enact the 
minimum coverage provision, reasoning that “Congress knows full well how to enact a tax when 
it chooses to do so.”140  
In addition to examining ACA’s form and structure, the Eleventh Circuit also used the substantive 
mechanics of the minimum coverage provision as evidence of Congress’s intent. ACA does not 
give the minimum coverage provision means of enforcement that are as strong as the panoply of 
enforcement provisions available to enforce the other provisions of the IRC. The court viewed 
this difference as bolstering the argument that the uniqueness of the minimum coverage provision 
indicated that Congress did not intend to exercise its taxing power.141  
Because the holding only went so far as to ascertain what Congress intended to do in ACA, it 
does not appear that the opinion says anything about the reach of a properly invoked exercise of 
Congress’s power to tax. Consequently, a close reading of the opinion would not likely pose an 
obstacle to a future effort by Congress to affect individuals’ behavior by imposing tax-based 
incentives or disincentives in order to encourage the purchase of private goods, so long as 
Congress explicitly invoked its power to tax.142 Instead questions about the scope of the taxing 
power remain largely unresolved, with only the limited guidance provided by pre-existing 
jurisprudence described supra. 
In evaluating whether the rest of ACA remained valid, the district court found the record to 
indicate that Congress would not have passed ACA without the minimum coverage provision, and 
that it was “indisputably essential” to the health reform effort.143 Evidence of this, the lower court 
explained, was a lack of a severability clause providing that the rest of the statute should remain 
intact if any particular provision is found to be unconstitutional. As the lower court noted, earlier 
versions of health reform legislation contained such a clause, but it was not included in the final 
                                                 
139 P.L. 111-148, §1501(a)(2)(D) and (a)(3). 
140 Florida v. HHS, slip op. 177-178. See also Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265 at 55 
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141 Although one might argue that a weaker enforcement regime has the effect of making the minimum essential 
coverage provision less penal, neither court reached the question of whether the minimum coverage provision is 
functionally a penalty because they both ended their inquiry under the taxing power with the initial conclusion that 
Congress intended it to be a penalty. 
142 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265 at 53 (6th Cir. 2011) (If Congress clearly 
intended to enact a tax, it would simplify court’s role “as it is easy to envision a system of national health care, 
including one with a minimum-essential-coverage provision, permissibly premised on the taxing power.”). 
143 Florida v. HHS, Case No.: 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, slip op at 66-67. When one section of a law is held 
unconstitutional, courts are faced with determining whether the remainder of the statute remains valid, or whether the 
whole statute or act is nullified. As noted by the Supreme Court, “Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not 
have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be 
dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976)). For a discussion of the issue of severability, see CRS Report 97-589, 
Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, by Larry M. Eig. 
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version of ACA.144 The appeals court disagreed with this reasoning and reversed this part of the 
district court’s decision, noting that the district court put too much emphasis on ACA’s lack of a 
severability clause. The appeals court relied on Supreme Court precedent favoring a strong 
presumption of severing unconstitutional provisions from the remainder of valid acts. It found 
that the without the requirement to have health insurance, the rest of the ACA’s provisions remain 
legally operative, and that the evidence needed to rebut this presumption had not been met.  
Following this decision, the Administration petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision to invalidate the minimum coverage provision on constitutional 
grounds.145 In addition, both the states and the private plaintiffs in the Florida case filed separate 
petitions with the Court for review of the appellate court’s holding that the mandate is severable 
from the rest of ACA.146 On November 14, 2011, the Supreme Court agreed to examine these 
issues.147 While not addressed in the Florida case, the Court also chose to examine whether a 
challenge to the minimum coverage provision is barred by the federal tax Anti-Injunction Act 
(AIA),148 which prohibits lawsuits seeking to restrain the assessment or collection of a tax.149 
Additionally, it agreed to evaluate whether the requirement may be severed from the rest of ACA. 
Aside from the requirement to have health insurance, the Court also granted the states’ petition 
for review of a question related to ACA’s expansion of the Medicaid program.150 
Sixth Circuit: Thomas More Law Center v. Obama 
In a 2-1 ruling, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Thomas More Law Center v. Obama151 
upheld the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision. The judges in the majority 
evaluated the requirement under the Commerce Clause and reached a conclusion based on 
somewhat different reasoning. Judge Martin, writing the opinion of the court, relied heavily on 
the Raich, Lopez, and Morrison decisions and found that the minimum coverage provision 
regulates economic activity. He also found that because of certain factors, such as the cost of 
providing care to uninsured individuals, Congress had a rational basis to conclude that allowing 
individuals to “self-insure” substantially affects interstate commerce.152 Additionally, the judge 
determined that the provision is essential to a larger economic scheme of reforming the health 
insurance and health care market.153 While the court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the 
minimum coverage provision, the court did agree with the Eleventh Circuit that that the 
                                                 
144 Id. at 67. 
145 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, HHS v. Florida, No. 11-398 (September 28, 2011). 
146 Unlike the petition of the private plaintiffs in the Florida case, the states are seeking review of other provisions of 
ACA, including the Medicaid expansion requirements. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Florida v. HHS, No. 11-400 
(September 27, 2011). 
147 Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, (U.S. November 14, 2011)(Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-
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148 26 U.S.C. §7421.  
149 See generally discussion of Liberty v. Geithner, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4th Cir. 2011), infra. 
150 For more information on this Medicaid issue, see CRS Report R42367, Federalism Challenge to Medicaid 
Expansion Under the Affordable Care Act: Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, by Kenneth R. 
Thomas, and CRS Report R40846, Health Care: Constitutional Rights and Legislative Powers, by Kathleen S. 
Swendiman. 
151 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265 (6th Cir. 2011). 
152 Id. at 35-37. 
153 Id. at 38-39. 
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Commerce Clause does not support a distinction between activity and inactivity, and neither does 
existing Supreme Court jurisprudence. However, unlike the Eleventh Circuit, Judge Martin still 
noted that the minimum coverage provision regulates individuals who are active in the health care 
market because of the market’s unique characteristics (e.g., the inevitability of an individual’s 
need for health care services).154 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Sutton indicated that the answer to whether the individual mandate 
is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power turns on two questions: first, whether it 
passes the “substantial effects test,” and second, whether there is something about the novelty of 
the requirement that warrants striking it down.155 With regard to the first question, and similar to 
Judge Martin, Judge Sutton found that Congress could reasonably conclude that self-insuring 
substantially affects interstate commerce, and that the requirement to have health insurance is 
economic in nature. With respect to the second question, Judge Sutton found nothing with respect 
to the minimum coverage provision that, under current Commerce Clause doctrine, established a 
constitutional defect.156 Also, unlike other courts that have evaluated the constitutionality of the 
requirement to have health insurance, Judge Sutton focused on the fact that the challenge 
mounted against the minimum coverage provision was deemed a “facial,” versus an “as-applied” 
challenge. Unlike as-applied challenges, which consider the validity of a statute as applied to a 
particular plaintiff, a plaintiff bringing a facial challenge must demonstrate that a particular 
requirement is unconstitutional in all of its applications. Judge Sutton explained that because 
there were certain settings in which Congress could apply the minimum coverage provision (e.g., 
for individuals who voluntarily purchased health coverage, but do not want to be forced to 
maintain it), this was sufficient to uphold a facial challenge to the minimum coverage provision’s 
constitutionality.157 
Two judges in the Sixth Circuit also found that the minimum coverage provision could not be 
supported under Congress’s power to tax, for largely the same reasons as the Eleventh Circuit, 
discussed supra.158 Specifically, the court held that the form and structure of ACA indicate that 
Congress intended this provision to be a penalty, even though the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that 
Congress likely has the power to use the tax code to create a financial disincentive to remain 
uninsured.159 Following the decision, the law center petitioned the Supreme Court for review of 
the case, and the petition is currently pending.160 One may assume that the Court may address this 
petition once it issues its decision in the Florida case. 
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155 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265 at 71 (Sutton, J. concurring). 
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157 Id. at 99. 
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Fourth Circuit: Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius and Liberty v. Geithner 
Unlike the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius161 and Liberty v. Geithner162 determined that it did not have jurisdiction to decide 
whether Congress is authorized under the Constitution to require the purchase of health insurance. 
Instead, the court in the Virginia case found that the Commonwealth did not have standing to 
bring an action. In Liberty University, the appeals court held that the university’s claim was 
barred by the federal tax Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), which prohibits lawsuits seeking to restrain 
the assessment or collection of a tax. Petitions for Supreme Court review of both cases are 
currently pending and may be held by the Court until after it issues a decision in the Florida 
case.163 
In Virginia, the commonwealth challenged the minimum coverage provision on the basis that 
Congress lacks authority to require individuals to purchase insurance.164 The case was brought in 
conjunction with the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act (VHCFA), a law stating that Virginia 
residents cannot be required to obtain or maintain a policy of health insurance coverage, except as 
required by a court or a state agency.165 Virginia also alleged that Congress did not have the 
authority to enact the minimum coverage provision under, among other things, its power to 
regulate interstate commerce and its taxing power. 
The district court found that the Commonwealth could bring the action and ruled that the 
minimum coverage provision is unconstitutional because it exceeds the boundaries of Congress’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause.166 The court also held that the General Welfare Clause 
does not provide authority for Congress to enact the minimum coverage provision, as it most 
closely resembles a penalty as opposed to a tax. Although it found the minimum coverage 
provision unconstitutional, the court did not strike down the entire act. Instead, it severed the 
minimum coverage provision and “directly-dependent provisions which make reference” to the 
section from the rest of ACA.167  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that it could not evaluate the merits of the case because the 
Commonwealth did not have standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision. The court 
noted, among other things, that the requirement imposes no obligation on the Commonwealth, 
and therefore it suffered no injury to warrant bringing the claim.168 The court also rejected 
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162 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4th Cir. 2011). 
163 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 11-420 (September 30, 2011); Petition for 
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ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 3:10cv188-HEH, slip op. at 9, fn. 4. 
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1014, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3247 (April 25, 2011). 
168 See Virginia, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18632 at 17. 
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Virginia’s argument that the federal requirement to purchase health insurance impermissibly 
conflicts with the VHCFA, explaining that because the only apparent function of the 
Commonwealth’s act is to immunize its citizens from compliance with federal law, there is no 
“concrete interest in the ‘continued enforceability’” of the act.169 As the court further explained, 
that “the mere existence of a state law like the VHCFA does not license a state to mount a judicial 
challenge to any federal statute with which the state law assertedly conflicts,” and that “only 
when a federal law interferes with a state’s exercise of its sovereign ‘power to create and enforce 
a legal code’” does the law cause the state to have the requisite injury needed for standing.170 
Conversely, in Liberty University v. Geithner, the District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge to the minimum coverage provision on the basis that the 
requirement was constitutional.171 In evaluating the requirement under the Commerce Clause, the 
court relied on the Wickard and Raich cases, among others, and found that an individual’s 
decision about whether or not to purchase health insurance is economic in nature. The district 
court also found that Congress had a rational basis to conclude that regulating this decision, in the 
aggregate, substantially affects the health care market. 
On September 8, 2011, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the AIA prevented the court 
from considering the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision. In contrast with other 
federal courts that have ruled on this issue, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that because the amount 
imposed for failure to comply with the requirement to purchase health insurance constitutes an 
exaction imposed by the Internal Revenue Code, and because the plaintiffs brought a pre-
enforcement challenge to the requirement, the AIA barred the action.172 While the university 
argued that the AIA did not apply to the case at hand because the consequence for failure to 
purchase health insurance is a “penalty,” rather than a “tax,” the appellate court relied on 
Supreme Court precedent and concluded that the AIA “reaches any exaction assessed by the 
Secretary pursuant to his authority under the Internal Revenue Code—even one that constitutes a 
‘penalty’ for constitutional purposes.”173 The court explained the broad nature of the AIA, and 
opined that the act bars challenges to exactions that are authorized to be assessed under the Tax 
Code, even though they may not be considered taxes under the General Welfare Clause.174 The 
appeals court vacated the district court’s decision, and remanded the case to the district court for 
dismissal.175 
Additional Issues Before the Supreme Court  
As mentioned above, in November 2011, the Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments in HHS v. 
Florida. Regardless of the outcome of the case, many view this challenge to ACA as historic—
not just because of the implications it may have for the regulation of health care, but also for how 
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it could generally affect the scope of Congress’s legislative powers. Oral arguments took place in 
this case during the last week of March 2012, and many expect the Court to reach a decision in 
June.  
Aside from evaluating the constitutional issues surrounding the requirement to have health 
insurance, the Court agreed to separately examine whether the Court is barred from evaluating the 
individual mandate at this time because of the Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits lawsuits 
seeking to restrain the assessment or collection of a tax. The Court also agreed to review the 
question of whether the individual mandate may be severed from the rest of ACA, assuming the 
individual mandate is found to be unconstitutional.176  
Anti-Injunction Act 
A federal law known as the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) generally provides that “no suit for the 
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by 
any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.”177 In 
response to lawsuits filed challenging the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision, 
the government initially argued that the suits were barred by the AIA, but withdrew that argument 
as the litigation progressed.178 However, the question of whether the AIA bars this litigation has 
been raised by three United States courts of appeals, on their own initiative, notwithstanding the 
fact that all the litigants before these courts agree that the AIA should not preclude a decision 
about the merits of the minimum coverage provision. Two of the three courts of appeals have held 
that the AIA does not apply to suits challenging the individual mandate,179 while one has held the 
opposite.180 In light of this circuit-split, the Supreme Court included this question in its writ of 
certiorari granted in response to petitions seeking review of the constitutional questions 
surrounding the individual mandate and other provisions of ACA. Oral arguments on this 
question were heard before the Supreme Court on March 26, 2012. 
Because the federal government is no longer raising the AIA as a defense to the challenges to the 
minimum coverage provision, the first question that must be answered in the context of the AIA is 
whether the applicability of the AIA must be addressed by the Court at all. Generally, litigants are 
permitted to waive potential defenses in federal court.181 However, this is not the case where the 
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defense is based on the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case.182 Therefore, 
if the AIA is a jurisdictional statute, it cannot be waived by the federal government. The Supreme 
Court has made statements in prior cases indicating that the AIA is a jurisdictional bar. For 
example, in Bob Jones University v. Simon, the Court held that the AIA “deprived the [federal] 
District Court of jurisdiction” to hear a case in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin the IRS from 
issuing a ruling denying the plaintiff’s tax-exempt status.183 Similarly, in Enochs v. Williams 
Packing and Navigation Company, the Court stated that “[t]he object of [the AIA] is to withdraw 
jurisdiction from the state and federal courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the 
collection of federal taxes.”184 On the other hand, the federal government had not sought to waive 
the AIA in either of these cases, so the Court may not have been directly addressing the issue of 
waiver when describing the AIA as jurisdictional. 
The second question presented by the AIA is whether these suits would fall within the class of 
suits that Congress has prohibited by enacting the AIA. The text of the AIA provides that no “suit 
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any 
court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was 
assessed.”185 Based on this language, the AIA would likely be an obstacle to these suits if they are 
suits to restrain the assessment or collection of any tax. In order to determine whether this is the 
case, one must first identify which tax would be at issue in the suit. The most obvious possibility 
here is that the penalty imposed on the failure to obtain health insurance as required by the 
minimum coverage provision is a tax for purposes of the AIA. The suits challenging the minimum 
coverage provision seek a declaration that Congress does not have the power to require 
individuals to purchase health insurance. If they are successful, the penalties imposed on 
individuals that fail to purchase health insurance could no longer be assessed or collected. 
Therefore, if the penalty is a tax for purposes of the AIA, then these suits would be barred. 
The AIA provides no definition of the term “tax.” However, federal courts have generally 
interpreted the term to refer to “an exaction for the support of the government.”186 Despite this 
broad interpretation, the Supreme Court has held that even where an exaction has been labeled as 
a tax, “when by its very nature the imposition is a penalty, it must be so regarded.”187 A number of 
commentators and lower courts have relied on the fact that the minimum coverage provision is 
described as a “penalty” in the text of the ACA. Other textual arguments may be made to support 
inclusion of the minimum coverage provision within the meaning of taxes for purposes of the 
AIA. For example, the provision specifically states that it should be “assessed and collected” in 
the same manner as assessable penalties that are subject to the AIA.188 Other explicit penalties in 
the Internal Revenue Code have been held to be subject to the AIA, but only where there were 
explicit statutory directives to treat such penalties as taxes or where the penalties were part of an 
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overall tax scheme.189 Neither of these characteristics appears to be present with respect to the 
minimum coverage provision. 
Finally, it should be noted that the use of the term “tax” in the context of the AIA is not identical 
to how that term is used for purposes of Congress’ power to levy taxes. In Bailey v. George, the 
Court applied the AIA to bar a suit challenging a tax on employers who used child labor on the 
same day that the Court struck down the same tax in a separate suit.190 Therefore, it is not 
necessarily true that if the Court were to determine that the minimum coverage provision is a tax 
for purposes of the AIA that it would be bound by that decision when determining whether the 
minimum coverage provision could be justified solely under the Taxing Power. 
Individual Mandate and Severability 
When a court finds a portion of a law to be unconstitutional, it may then confront the issue of 
whether to strike what is unconstitutional and uphold the remainder, or whether to declare the rest 
a law invalid, either partially or in its entirety.191 The Supreme Court agreed to review the 
question of whether the individual mandate can be severed from the remainder of ACA. This 
section provides an overview of severability precedent, discusses severability arguments in the 
Florida case, and addresses some of the considerations that the Supreme Court could take into 
account in evaluating the severability of the individual mandate. 
Background 
Current severability doctrine is based on the premise that courts “should refrain from invalidating 
more of a statute than is necessary….”192 Courts also express reluctance to rewrite or restructure a 
statute in order to preserve the remaining portions of a law.193 The Supreme Court has, on 
multiple occasions, recited a “well-established” standard for determining the severability of an 
unconstitutional provision, under which severability is presumed: “‘[u]nless it is evident that the 
Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of 
that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.’” 194 
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Notwithstanding this standard, it is generally recognized that the “touchstone” of a court’s 
severability analysis is congressional intent.195  
In one of the modern and more frequently cited Supreme Court cases exploring severability, 
Alaska Airlines v. Brock, the Court evaluated whether an unconstitutional legislative veto 
provision allowing Congress to nullify Department of Labor regulations could be removed from 
employee protection provisions in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.196 In examining the 
remaining employee protection provisions of the Act, the Court noted that because the legislative 
veto was, by its nature, separate from the operation of the substantive provisions of the Act, there 
was little guidance as to Congress’s intent regarding severability of the veto. The Court therefore 
noted that “the more relevant inquiry” was whether the severed statute “will function in a manner 
consistent with the intent of Congress.”197  
The Court went on to find “abundant indication[s]” of congressional intent for severability in the 
language, structure, and legislative history of the Airline Deregulation Act.198 The Court pointed 
out, for example, that with respect to the number of duties that the Act placed on air carriers with 
respect to employees, there was not much of substance subject to a veto.199 There were also, 
according to the Court, several indications that Congress regarded the labor protections as an 
important part of the Airline Deregulation Act, but paid “scant attention” to the legislative veto 
provision.200 The Court found no conclusive evidence that Congress would have refused to pass 
the Act with its employee protections, but without the legislative veto. Accordingly, it found the 
legislative veto provision severable. 
In one of the Court’s most recent cases to address severability, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. 
Accounting Oversight Board, the Court reaffirmed use of this severability standard, as well as its 
deference to Congress in matters of legislative restructuring. 201 In that case, the Court looked at 
the constitutionality of a provision in Sarbanes-Oxley Act that created a public board with 
members that were subject to removal by an agency for violation of specified federal laws, and 
not directly by the President. After finding that the board’s tenure provisions violated separation 
of powers principles, the Court briefly addressed the severability question. The Court found the 
remainder of the large Act “‘fully operative as a law’” with these tenure restrictions excised, and 
that “nothing in the statute’s text or historical context made it “evident” that Congress, faced with 
the limitations imposed by the Constitution, would have preferred no Board at all to a Board 
whose members are removable at will.”202 The Court noted that theoretically, it could “blue-
pencil” a number of fixes to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but it found such “editorial freedom” more 
appropriate for the Congress, rather than the Court.203  
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In assessing whether a provision is severable from the rest of a statute, the Court has also 
considered the purpose of the congressional act and how the provision interacts with that purpose. 
For example, in New York v. U.S., the Court evaluated a challenge to the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which addressed disposal of this waste.204 The Court 
struck down on constitutional grounds a provision requiring states or a regional compact to take 
title to and possession of low level radioactive waste under certain circumstances, but left other 
incentives for dealing with the waste in place. The Court explained that “[c]ommon sense 
suggests that where Congress has enacted a statutory scheme for an obvious purpose, and where 
Congress has included a series of provisions operating as incentives to achieve that purpose, the 
invalidation of one of the incentives should not ordinarily cause Congress’ overall intent to be 
frustrated.”205  
Other recent cases such as U.S. v. Booker seem to demonstrate some willingness of the Court to 
amend a statutory scheme in order to preserve congressional intent.206 After holding that the 
mandatory nature of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for criminal offenses was unconstitutional, 
the Court conducted a severability analysis, and, in a 5-4 decision, severed two sections of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which had the effect of replacing the mandatory guidelines with 
those operating in a discretionary manner.207 The Court indicated that it sought to determine 
“what ‘Congress would have intended’ in light of the Court’s constitutional holding.”208 The 
Court acknowledged that the remedy chosen by the majority of the Court, i.e., discretionary 
sentencing guidelines, as well as the different remedy proposed by the minority, would 
“significantly alter the system that Congress designed.”209 However, it explained that because of 
the constitutional holding, Congress’s desire to have mandatory sentencing guidelines was no 
longer possible. Accordingly, the Court stated its role was to decide which remedy “would deviate 
less radically from Congress’s system….”210 The Court also noted its responsibility to retain those 
portions of the Act that were “(1) constitutionally valid, (2) capable of ‘functioning 
independently,’ and (3) consistent with Congress’ objectives in enacting the statute.”211 By 
severing the two provisions the Court concluded that the remainder of the Act met the three 
constitutional requirements.212  
Additionally, the Court has noted that while the answer to a severability inquiry can sometimes be 
“elusive,”213 the inquiry may be clarified by the presence of a severability clause.214 The inclusion 
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of a severability clause reinforces the presumption that Congress preferred for the valid portion of 
a statute in question to remain standing.215 However, the Court has expressed multiple times that 
the lack of a severability clause does not create a presumption against severability. 216  
The Florida Case 
Both the state and private petitioners in the Florida case argue that ACA should be struck down in 
its entirety. However, the Administration advocates for partial severability, arguing that certain 
health insurance provisions, i.e., the “community rating” and “guaranteed issue” provisions, are 
inseverable from the individual mandate, but that the rest of the Act should remain valid. In 
general, the guaranteed issue requirements compel health insurers to accept everyone that applies 
and prevent an insurer from denying health insurance coverage based factors such as health 
status. 217 The community rating provisions prohibit health insurers from charging higher 
premiums based on health factors.218 The Administration submits that Congress intended that 
these insurance provisions work together, because without the individual mandate, individuals 
would simply wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care, which would make the 
market dysfunctional.219 In light of the fact that the Administration and the state and private 
petitioners in Florida agree to at least partial severability, the Court appointed an amicus to argue 
in support of the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit: that the individual mandate alone should be 
severed from the remainder of the ACA. 
In Florida, the district court reached the opposite conclusion, striking down the ACA, and 
generally finding that while many provisions in ACA could function independently of the 
individual mandate, they could not function “in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress.”220 This was because, as the district court explained, the individual mandate, was 
“indisputably essential” to the health reform effort.221 The lack of a severability clause, the district 
court found, was evidence of this idea that the rest of the statute should not remain intact. It noted 
that earlier versions of health reform legislation contained such a clause, but it was not included 
in the final version of ACA.222 The district court distinguished the instant case from cases like 
Alaska Airlines, where the provision at issue was “uncontroversial,” and where legislative history 
demonstrated its “relative unimportance,” compared to ACA, where the individual mandate is “at 
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the heart of the Act.” 223 The court also explained that it was impossible for the court to go 
through the lengthy, complex statute to ascertain which provisions would or would not have to be 
severed along with the individual mandate, and accordingly nullified the Act.224  
The appeals court disagreed with the district court’s holding of “wholesale invalidation” of ACA 
and reversed this part of the district court’s decision. In deciding to only excise the individual 
mandate, the court opined that “the lion’s share of the Act has nothing to do with private 
insurance, much less the mandate to buy insurance.”225 The Eleventh Circuit noted that “in light 
of the stand-alone nature of hundreds of the Act’s provisions and their manifest lack of 
connection to the individual mandate, the plaintiffs have not met the heavy burden needed to 
rebut the presumption of severability.”226 The appellate court also disagreed with the district 
court’s emphasis on the lack of a severability clause in ACA.227 In deciding to sever the individual 
mandate alone, while leaving the insurance reforms intact, the court found that certain factors 
relevant in determining congressional intent. For example, relying on the Booker and New York 
cases, the court explained that ACA contains many other provisions besides the individual 
mandate that could help to accomplish the goals of ACA (i.e., accessibility of health insurance 
coverage and a reduction of the number of uninsured individuals).228 Cutting against the idea that 
ACA would fail to function without the individual mandate but with the other health insurance 
reforms preserved, the court observed that the individual mandate is, similar to the legislative 
veto in Alaska Airlines, limited in its operation, because, e.g., there are individuals who are 
excepted from having to buy health insurance or pay a penalty.229 For these reasons and others, 
the court was not persuaded that it was “evident” that Congress would not have enacted the 
guaranteed issue and community rating reforms without the individual mandate.230 
Supreme Court Arguments 
If the Court determines that the individual mandate is unconstitutional and undertakes a 
severability analysis of ACA, the Court will likely evaluate legislative intent to determine the 
extent to which ACA should remain intact. In conjunction with that evaluation, the Court may 
explore whether ACA could function without the individual mandate. Other factors may also 
come into play in ascertaining whether other provisions of ACA remain valid. It should be noted 
that while the Court could address severability if it were to find the expansion of the Medicaid 
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program under ACA unconstitutional, the question explicitly granted review by the Court, and 
thus the focus of this overview, addressed the severability of the individual mandate. 
In determining congressional intent, the Court may, as it has in previous cases, frame its inquiry 
as whether it is evident that Congress would have passed ACA without the individual mandate. 
The parties to the litigation disagree about what to evaluate in answering this fundamental 
question. Private and state petitioners, for example, claim that this part of the severability inquiry 
should largely be focused on, as noted in Alaska Airlines, whether the “balance of the Act can 
function in the manner that Congress intended.”231 Applying this standard to ACA, state and 
private petitioners generally contend that the requirement to have health insurance is the 
centerpiece of ACA, which is essential to achieving universal health coverage, and to remove it 
would fundamentally alter what Congress intended.232 They explain that this conclusion is 
reinforced by legislative history addressing the importance of the individual mandate. 233 
Petitioners further point to the contentious legislative process through which ACA was created, 
e.g., the narrow margin under which the Act was passed, as an indication that the Act would have 
failed had there been any changes to it (e.g., removing the minimum coverage provision).234  
The Administration, on the other hand, relies on the idea that the Court generally tries not to 
invalidate more of a statute than is necessary. One of the Administration’s central arguments is 
that the majority of ACA should remain valid because the Act contains a number of tools for 
improving the health care market that “operate independently of the [individual mandate] and 
would advance Congress’s goal of expanding affordable coverage if that provision were 
invalidated.”235 It contends further that “there is no basis for invalidating as inseverable 
provisions of the Act that have no apparent connection at all, let alone an inextricably close 
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connection, to the [individual mandate].”236 The Administration notes that evidence of this idea 
includes the fact that while the individual mandate does not take effect until 2014, there are many 
provisions of ACA that are effective before then.237 Similar to the 11th Circuit, the Administration 
claims that the intent of many of ACA’s provisions, not just the individual mandate alone, is to 
broaden access to affordable health care.238 They argue that this situation is similar to cases like 
New York, where there was a “common purpose,” and where the Court found it appropriate to 
sever an unconstitutional provision from the rest of a valid act, even where the provision related 
to one of the primary objectives of the congressional enactment.  
However, unlike the 11th Circuit, the Administration claims that Congress intended for the 
guaranteed issue and community rating provisions to be integral to the individual mandate. 
Without the mandate, it argues, individuals would not purchase health insurance until they needed 
care, which would leave more unhealthy people with insurance. As a result, premiums would 
increase, which is precisely what Congress did not want.239 Accordingly, the Administration 
argues that because the individual mandate is needed to make those insurance reforms effective, 
the guaranteed issue and community rating provisions are inseverable from the individual 
mandate, while the rest of the Act should stand.240  
The Court-appointed amicus defends the 11th Circuit position, stating that the focus should be on 
the question of whether Congress would have preferred an ACA with no individual mandate, to 
no ACA at all.241 Similar to the Administration, the amicus argues, among other things, that 
besides the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements, many provisions of ACA have 
little, if any connection to the individual mandate. Relying on cases like Booker, the amicus 
disputes the petitioner’s claim that severability turns on the question of whether the statute 
functions in the manner that Congress intended.242 Additionally, the amicus reasons that the 
guaranteed issue and community rating should also stand, as it is improbable that Congress would 
have wanted for health insurance consumers to be in the position they were in before the act: 
potentially subject to things like denials of coverage because of their health conditions.243 The 
                                                 
236 Reply Brief for the Respondents (Severability) at 7, NFIB v. Sebelius; Florida v. HHS, (2012) (Nos. 11-393 and 11-
400) (quotations omitted). 
237 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents (Severability) at 29. 
238 See Reply Brief for the Respondents (Severability) at 6.  
239 Id. at 8-9. 
240 See generally Brief for the Respondents (Severability) at 44-47, Brief for the State Petitioners (Severability) at 12, 
47; Brief for the Private Petitioners (Severability) at 36-40. 
241 Brief For the Court-Appointed amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability, NFIB v. Sebelius; Florida v. HHS, 
(2012) (Nos. 11-393 and 11-400). It should be noted, however, that private petitioners argue that this description of the 
severability inquiry is consonant with the petitioner’s focus on “whether the statute will function in a manner consistent 
with the intent of Congress.” See Reply Brief for the Private Petitioners (Severability) at 7-8. 
242 As the amicus notes:  
The Court’s decisions since Alaska Airlines demonstrate that the “manner consistent with the intent 
of Congress” language was not meant to rewrite basic severability analysis. In Booker, for example, 
the Court replaced a system of mandatory criminal sentencing with a discretionary sentencing 
system, even though it was readily apparent that Congress had intended the system to work in a 
mandatory “manner.” … Severability analysis thus must begin with a recognition that the statute as 
enacted by Congress cannot stand. And, once it is acknowledged that the law inevitably will be 
altered, a preference for preserving the valid portions of the statute is the best of the possible 
options.  
Id. at 17-18.  
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amicus argues that while Congress expected these health insurance requirements to work together 
with the individual mandate, it is not evident that Congress would have wanted to remove those 
benefits from individuals, which can still be effective without the individual mandate.  
One factor that the Court may consider in evaluating congressional intent is the congressional 
findings accompanying the individual mandate. As discussed above, the findings state, among 
other things, that the individual mandate is “an essential part of this larger regulation of economic 
activity, and the absence of the requirement would undercut Federal regulation of the health 
insurance market.”244 The findings further provide that it is “essential to creating effective health 
insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do 
not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.”245 It is not clear whether the Court 
might regard these findings as an indicator that Congress regarded the individual mandate as an 
indispensable part of ACA, as the petitioners argue;246 as an expression of Congress’s view that 
the individual mandate is inseparable from the guaranteed issue and community rating provisions, 
as the Administration claims;247 or conversely, unrelated to the severability question, as a 
demonstration of Congress’s view that the individual mandate plays an essential role in a broader 
regulatory scheme for purposes of the Commerce Clause, as the amicus contends.248 Phrasing this 
latter position differently, the findings arguably address Congress’s position on its power to enact 
the provision, not its preference as to what should happen to the rest of ACA without it.  
Other arguments that could influence the decision of the Court include the lack of a severability 
clause in ACA. While recent Supreme Court jurisprudence does not place great emphasis on the 
existence of the clause in legislation, petitioners argue that this case is distinguishable, as there 
was a severability clause in earlier versions of the health reform bill that was removed in the 
health reform bill that passed and became ACA.249 The Administration contends that the lack of 
such a clause in ACA is insignificant and disputes the idea that a clause was removed from the 
bill that was enacted by Congress, as a severability clause was only included in a House bill that 
was never considered in the Senate.250 The Administration also contends that severability clauses 
in the acts that ACA amends (e.g., the Internal Revenue Code) could apply to ACA’s 
provisions.251 In addition, the Administration claims that the Court should not address 
inseverability of provisions that do not affect the plaintiffs. The Administration asserts that the 
petitioners “may not challenge the myriad provisions of the Act that do not apply to them,” and 
that “[p]arties must demonstrate standing for each form of relief they seek and, in doing so, 
cannot rely on the rights of third parties.”252 The Administration relies on Printz v. United 
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States,253 a case in which the Court declined to address certain provisions of a statute that 
“burden[ed] only” parties outside the litigation.254 However, the petitioners and amicus disagree 
with this position, contending, among other things, that the Court is not constrained to 
considering remedies only affecting the interests of the parties to the instant case.255  
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